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Discredited Metaphors of Mind Limit Our Vision
Marilyn Middendorf

O

f all teachers, teachers of writing probably have the surest insight, the closest look into the minds of their students. Most of us appreciate and try to
nurture the tangled process of developing meaning out of private universes. We
glimpse the unruly, outwardly chaotic jumble of our students’ thoughts. We deploy diverse strategies to help our students create order, acceptable logic, appropriate voices. More than most teachers, writing teachers see the shifting, chaotic
process that eventually results in “the final paper.” But what happens in students’
minds as they battle to “take charge” of their communications? Do we have a
clue? We are certainly proud of our training, yet lately I’ve recognized a basic
element missing in that training.
When we successfully initiate students into our current model of communication—“sender-receiver, information transfer”—we reinforce our culture’s central metaphor of mind. In this essay, I want to explore the possibility that our
dominant model of communication is unrealistic primarily because it is derived
from a misleading metaphor of mind. Our image of our mind limits us as we
approach our students and attempt to shape their communication.
Without doubt, our mental imagery controls much of what we do. When we
are dealing with students’ thinking, what metaphor of consciousness are we harboring? What are our cultural assumptions about consciousness? Do we, as teachers, have different assumptions from our surrounding culture? Do we have a clearer
image of consciousness? After all, our business is shaping and sharpening our
students’ minds. What do we suppose happens in consciousness when a thought
is “translated” into writing, into meaning? The cartoon image shows a light bulb
shining brightly. Another common image is wheels turning. Is our understanding
of consciousness no more sophisticated than this? Our central metaphor of mind
is so seldom discussed in our culture or our profession that it is nearly invisible.
Yet this ghostly image dictates much of what we do.
I asked several of my colleagues and students to describe their images of
their own consciousness. They did better than light bulbs and wheels. After casual, open discussion, they suggested abstracted beings, like the Ghost in the
Machine; the Grand Interpreter; the Central Meaner; the Homunculus (the little
man who sits inside reviewing everything); I, the Decision Maker; and I, the
Dictator. One suggested a disembodied Seat of Consciousness. A number (mainly
students) pictured their individual consciousness as a computer, only a really big
one, “like we’ll have in the future.” All of these images of consciousness share a
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common thread: a mysterious Someone or Something is assumed to be “in control.” In the Western world, the debate over the centuries among philosophers
has been about what is IN THERE producing thoughts? Thus far, the debate has
always assumed a “top down” approach. Some ill-defined “central controller” is
in charge of the mental process.
Nearly all our “top down” metaphors for consciousness are similar because
of our Western tradition and the historical importance of Cartesian dualism. The
pressure of history makes it difficult for us to even imagine any reality other than
dualism. Dualism is taken for granted. We embrace the mind/body split, in part,
because our culture reinforces this image at nearly every turn: the spirit soars
and the flesh plods along, the spirit is created by God while the flesh is made
from clay, mind over matter, from dust to dust while the spirit lives on. In step
with our culture, we educators harbor this metaphor of human consciousness
which, it turns out, might be misleading. Our collective metaphors, mostly
unexamined, may be limiting the richness of our inner lives and inhibiting our
understanding of the mystery of consciousness. Recent discoveries in the “brain
sciences” posit a new metaphor for consciousness, one quite contrary to our standard assumptions. Moreover, these recent discoveries in the “brain sciences” erode
the mind/body hierarchy of dualism. Even worse, they ask us to accept materialism as a scientific certainty. Our wonderful minds are composed solely of physical matter.
Although we reap the vast benefits of all that science has wrought, our culture seems to coexist grudgingly and reluctantly with the “truths” posited by science. We benefit from and appreciate (not uncritically) the intellectual leadership of the scientific establishment. Scientists function almost as “priests” did
before the age of science; they reveal secrets of the physical universe which only
they can “see.” Typically, these scientists do not ask the general public to understand “too much” about their discoveries. Our culture and these “priests” dwell
in different belief systems, almost parallel universes. One of the bedrock assumptions of the “scientific world view” discredits dualism. The hierarchical mind/
body split of dualism is regarded as quaint, hopelessly naive. Although fundamentally anti-dualist, John Searle is kinder than many of his colleagues exploring matters of the brain:
The separation between mind and matter was a useful heuristic tool
in the seventeenth century, a tool that facilitated a great deal of
progress that took place in the sciences. However, the separation is
philosophically confused, and by the twentieth century it had become a massive obstacle to a scientific understanding of the place
of consciousness within the natural world. (85)
Searle claims that our culture is “historically conditioned to think” (14) in
the vocabulary of dualism and that prevents even “good thinkers” from comprehending their “inner reality.” He further asserts that dualism is totally discredited by anyone with “even a modicum of ‘scientific’ education” (91). What percentage of citizens have at least this much understanding of scientific basics? I
would hope that the number is large, but I fear it is not. An editorialist in The
New Yorker, pondering the immense power of sheer belief which led to the mass
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suicide of the Heaven’s Gate cult, concludes that “[T]hough science is stronger
today than when Galileo knelt before the Inquisition, it remains a minority habit
of mind, and its future is very much in doubt” (Ferris 31). Our culture seems
mired in ancient belief systems which the scientific world has abandoned. Dualism is the unrealistic yet dominant belief system of our 21st century culture where
the scientific world view remains a “minority habit of mind.”
Questioning dualism is difficult. Our Western culture has created a masterful image of human glory and our special relationship to the material world.
Michelangelo’s image of God, the Father, touching life into Adam infuses our
lives with meaning and purpose. Our mental imagery is stuck in a pre-industrial,
pre-Darwinian world. For most, this world of images goes unexamined. One who
does explore this usually uncharted territory is David Denby. In retracing Darwin’s
journey, Denby expresses our general reluctance to look into the face of scientific “reality” because it affects us personally: “That human beings had descended
from the apes was no longer difficult to accept. But the notion that human existence is a mere accident—that the glittering jewel, consciousness, is just another
adaptive mechanism—was a vile blow to one’s self-esteem” (59). Many of us
deny the “scientific reality” of materialism for so many powerful historical, religious, and personal reasons that the subject is nearly taboo. But it is a given in
scientific circles.
If we educators approach the new theories of consciousness with “eyes” that
can see, we need to first distance ourselves from the usual dualistic assumptions
we make about ourselves and our students. We must be skeptical of our
unexamined metaphors and explore how they might distort the way we picture
our “inner workings.” These new theories of consciousness offer “new ways of
thinking,” new metaphors of consciousness to replace the old.
The “brain sciences” themselves have only begun to tackle the mystery of
consciousness. For the first 90 years of the 20th century, these scientists did not
delve into the subject of consciousness. Now, the many scientific disciplines honing in on the question of consciousness have collectively agreed on a few fundamentals. They agree that the problem of consciousness—although the most mysterious of all mysteries tackled by the scientific method—will be solved. This
conviction itself is a radical departure from the conventional wisdom of a decade
ago. One of the leading theorists, Daniel Dennett ponders the difficulty of imagining how the mind can emanate from the material brain, and concludes that “you
really have to know quite a lot of what science has discovered about how brains
work, but much more important, you have to learn new ways of thinking” (Consciousness 16). After only two decades of laboratory experimentation on how the
brain works, the advances coming from neuroscience in particular will help us
“connect what we know about our minds to what we know (scientifically) about
our brains” (Edelman 4). These scientists hope that this new information will
help our culture cast off the historical blinders that keep us from understanding
our inner workings. This new information about our brains (which I sketchily
review here) may facilitate “new ways of thinking.”
Dennett claims that dualism leaves us with “bad grammar” that compels us
to buy into the Cartesian world view even if we know it is discredited. We see
ourselves as “witnessing” our inner workings; however, Dennet claims that “events
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that happen in your brain, just like events that happen in your stomach or your
liver, are not normally witnessed by anyone” (Consciousness 29). We tend to
imagine a “self” sitting inside our head, processing the proceedings. This picture
distorts the reality that science has now documented. No “I” is in charge. Only
our material gray matter creates all our mind stuff. Our mental life is a purely
physical process, and this process is out of our hands.
So what metaphors for mind are consistent with the new data? Dennett proposes new vocabulary for a new model: Multiple Drafts from the Pandemonium
Theater. This metaphor pushes our understanding of mind closer to the chaotic
stream of life being lived. If there is no center, if no “I” is in charge of consciousness, what goes on during thought? Dennett’s Multiple Drafts model posits
that perceptions and all mental activities are subjected to “continuous ‘editorial
revision’” (Consciousness 111). He describes thinking as follows:
These editorial processes occur over large fractions of a second,
during which time various additions, incorporations [. . .] and
overwritings of content can occur, in various orders. We don’t directly experience what happens on our retinas, in our ears, on the
surface of our skin. What we actually experience is a product of
many processes of interpretation—editorial processes, in effect.
They take in relatively raw and one-sided representations, and they
take place in the streams of activity in various parts of the brain.
This much is recognized by virtually all theories of perception, but
now we are poised for the novel feature of the Multiple Drafts model:
Feature detections or discriminations only have to be made once.
That is, once a particular “observation” of some feature has been
made, by a specialized, localized portion of the brain, the information content thus fixed does not have to be sent somewhere else to
be rediscriminated by some “master” discriminator. (112-13)
Our brain’s physical processing “editorializes” our existence for us. The brain
as a biological organ simply “stores” the interpretations it makes, incorporating
the new input with all the other bits of previously interpreted information (Consciousness 127). The information stream is turbulent and wild, bursting its banks,
creating new channels, meandering at random. However, when one of these drafts
is “published” through utterance, when a thought finds language, our common
sense (and dualism) tells us that some One was in control of that utterance. We
assume a Central Meaner from the Cartesian Theater issued a statement, proving
“I” was in charge of my mental processes. Dennett argues that the complex physical processes of our brain can only render drafts upon drafts from the Pandemonium Theater. The Central Meaner—the “I”—changes any time and every time
the stream is dipped into. This “flow” is how we think! The stream of consciousness—electrical and chemical impulses—flows out of our control. He describes
our mental process as highly chaotic, totally unique to the moment and not duplicative. If this picture is our mental reality (as these scientists posit), no wonder
we grasp for any sense of order.
We assume a Self—an “I”—is in charge, but Dennett exposes this sense of
Self as a fiction. He argues that our material brain cells create “us” and take “us”
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along on a magnificent ride. According to this Multiple Drafts metaphor, our consciousness is a flowing, evolving collection of narratives. The words straining to
“translate” our inner thoughts are highly revised narratives “from deep inside the
system” (Consciousness 238). Thus, we negotiate with our external environments
through these narratives. According to Dennett, words are as integral to humans
as webs are to spiders and dams are to beavers: “Our fundamental tactic of selfprotection, self-control, and self-definition is not spinning webs or building dams,
but telling stories, and more particularly concocting and controlling the story we
tell others—and ourselves—about who we are” (418). These sustaining narratives come forth naturally, effortlessly and seem as if from a single source. The
illusion is natural, but Dennett warns us that “our tales are spun, but for the most
part we don’t spin them; they spin us. Our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not their source” (Consciousness 418). No One
controls the mental processes, and no Self concocts the narratives told; the physical
process produces the One, the Self, the delusion of a Central Meaner. Dennett
admits that his Multiple Drafts model is his beginning attempt to forge “new
ways of thinking” about our inner reality.
Once we understand the massive complexity of our consciousness, as explained by the “brain sciences,” materialism becomes easier to accept. To be only
made of matter loses its demeaning connotation, its deflating aspect, when we
begin to understand the degree of complexity that matter is capable of achieving.
That is what the recent discoveries of the “brain sciences” are forcing our culture
to confront. I, for one, thank them. Reading these theorists has given me new
insight—new mental imagery and understanding—about my own inner world. I
feel released from false expectations and more deeply appreciative of my turbulence and density, of both my dreaming and wakeful consciousness. Dennett confesses to the usual human foible: “We would like to think of ourselves as godlike
creators of ideas, manipulating and controlling them as our whim dictates, and
judging them from an independent, Olympian standpoint. But even if this is our
ideal, we know that it is seldom if ever our reality” (Darwin 346). For Dennett,
Pandemonium prevails in our brains, and “we” are created—“spun”—by its elaborate physical processes.
Another leading theorist pictures an even more contrarian model of mind.
Working from the same scientific discoveries about the brain’s structure, composition, organization, and evolution, Gerald Edelman claims that neuroscience is
“on the threshold of knowing how we know” (xiii). His biologically-based theory
of consciousness accomplishes two goals: to explain our consciousness as we
“know” it to be (both personally and scientifically) and to explore our place as a
species of life created through natural selection. His model of mind exalts the
“how” and demotes the “what.” Nothing is magic about “what” composes the
nervous system. Our three pounds of gray matter is made of ordinary cells, called
neurons. For Edelman, the magic is “how” these simple cells are able to connect
to one another. Our neuronal networks are capable of “massive connectivity”
which makes the human brain not only “the most complicated material object in
the known universe” but also “something unique in the universe” (17). Even
though this hyperdense connectivity is difficult for most of us to imagine, Edelman
argues that we experience it within our own consciousness all the time. Edelman
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helps us visualize the “massiveness” of our brain material by explaining that it
would take 32 million years to count the synapses (connections) if we counted
them one per second (17). Furthermore, none of these massive connections is
“hardwired.” These individual connections organize themselves into neuronal
groups, which in turn form “maps” or networks of “maps” for sensations and
thoughts to travel. These “maps” form connections to other “maps” and networks
of “maps.” These, in turn, collide, merge, diverge, fragment, overlap, strike out
to new “maps.” Neuronal “maps,” working together, create brain activity on their
own. One word, say “sailboat,” lights up “maps” everywhere throughout the brain;
with the second mention, the “mapping” is similar but not identical, as new connections to other networks are made, hence strengthening some while neglecting
others. The path the “map” creates is never the same. Common sense tells us that
our brains are primarily concerned with registering sensory data from the outside, but neuroscience has proven the opposite to be true. The brain is “more in
touch with itself than with anything else” (19). The brain’s connectivity is ceaseless. We experience this faintly during dreaming, the brain coursing through its
circuits without conscious “control.” This startling fact suggests that our biology
makes us self-absorbed, almost “locked in” by our own circuitry. Our uniquely
complex brains generate our minds. The connective texture spins so richly, so
immensely, so turbulently that a consciousness arises from the material circuitry.
No thing or no one is in control. The material process of “mapping” creates the
individual.
Edelman pictures consciousness arising from a massive material system of
such complexity that it is difficult to comprehend. This material system is elaborately and complexly “mapped” and “running on its own” energy and under its
own innate guidance. Each brain organizes itself by itself. While the anatomy of
the brain makes human brains seem alike, no two brains—not even those of identical twins with hypothetical identical life experiences—can be alike. The neuronal groups of each brain and the “mapping choices” are totally unique to an
individual organism—during embryonic development as well as during life. Thus,
the brain’s organization is interactive, self-monitoring, recursive, continual, and
original to that individual brain, in all phases of life. Through electrical/chemical mechanisms, neuronal groups create sprawling, overlapping “maps” which
are so dense, shifting, and variable that the “paths” are not actually laid down or
hard-wired. These “paths” are not identifiable, reversible, or even repeatable (for
each “path” taken alters the path itself). Edelman claims that we do not “store”
the idea of “sailboat” anywhere, as most of us imagine. Instead, the word lights
certain networks of “maps” but not always the same ones; the word fires differently at different times and always will. This idea is similar to Dennett’s concept
of the mental stream being dipped into at random. The physical process drives
the activity. The “mapping” operates beyond an individual’s control. In a sense,
the “mapping choices” generate the individual.
I have greatly compressed his elaborate arguments and illustrations to give a
taste of the enormous complexity that neuroscience has uncovered about our great
mystery, our consciousness. While the individual disciplines of the “brain sciences” argue ferociously, there are core agreements about a scientific way to
understand ourselves. Is this picture of our material minds being out of our con-
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trol distressing? I think not. Dennett creates a charming metaphor of mind to
alleviate any hint of distress. Edelman admits no distress whatsoever. Indeed, he
seems to be in awe of (and inspires awe about) our magnificent, uniquely complex, material nervous system that produces human consciousness.
Edelman explores how such a complex system as consciousness arose—a
product of the process of natural selection. For Dennett, we are totally adrift,
floating on a deep well of “editorializations” with no control. For Edelman, the
“mapping choices” our immensely connected brain makes are out of our control,
but—here’s the kicker—these choices are based on value for the individual organism and the species. Thus, the process of consciousness is not haphazard (as
in Dennett’s metaphor) but based on value, and hence, advancement and progress.
Edelman takes a “bottom-up” look at our human consciousness and our place in
the natural realm. He urges us to discard all our normal metaphors for ourselves
because they distort the richness (and reality) of our mental lives. With his theory
of consciousness, he intends to reunite the spiritual and corporeal, the mind and
the body, and put the human mind back into nature—from which it emerged during the process of natural selection. His central metaphor for mind is jungle: “the
chemical and electrical dynamics of the brain resemble [nothing so much as] the
sound and light patterns and the movement and growth patterns of a jungle” (29).
For Edelman, the most apt and realistic metaphor for our brains, the individual
consciousness that arises from them, is that they were as intricate, delicate and
adaptive as a thriving jungle. The ecological efficiency of an evolving jungle is
densely interconnective and creative. It grows as it lives. The jungle has no hierarchy, but it has dense, shifting patterns. These patterns are created—perhaps
even controlled—by the process of natural selection. (Natural selection as a process producing diverse “products” is more sophisticated than our culture’s grasp
of it as only survival of the fittest; rather, the process “selects” based on value
for the individual organism, the species, and the cooperating environment.) As
natural selection keeps the jungle healthy through a selection process based on
value, so do the “mapping choices” of our functioning brains. The brain has
evolved as a product of natural selection, and it mimics the selection system which
gave it birth. The brain spins forth a consciousness so powerful that it can contemplate the laws of nature of which it is a part. We can ask “why” and answer
“why not.” We can construct myths to explain the mysteries of our observed universe. We can spiritualize our vast material systems. But we cannot leave the
system that spawned us, for we are that system, product and process. Both Edelman
and Dennett conclude their books by reiterating that their individual theories are
only the beginning in the search for this particular truth about the material world,
truth about consciousness. They openly invite challenges from other disciplines
probing the brain. Nothing is set in stone except certain foundational assumptions. Consciousness is a material process, vastly and densely complex, operating beyond our control but creating “us” as on-going works in progress, as individuals and as a species.
All educators, especially composition teachers, should be aware of these recent findings of the “brain sciences.” They certainly challenge the foundational
image of consciousness dominant in our culture. Based on scientific data, these
new findings claim that consciousness is not a miracle product, located some-
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where magical, but a chaotically complex material process, totally de-centered,
indeterminate, self-organizing, and creative. I am, you are, and they are. We are;
therefore, we think. And it’s a jungle in there.
What can composition teachers learn from these changed metaphors of how
consciousness works? I have already altered my perceptions, my pictures, of my
mind at work and of my students’ minds at work. I have gained more respect for
the complexity of the writing and communication tasks we require of our students. So far, this appreciation is too abstract to turn into lesson plans, but it has
altered my pedagogy in profound ways. My foundational metaphors have changed,
and these changes percolate up. It’s “a bottom-up” process, like consciousness.
Another “bottom up” process is taking place in the field of composition studies, I hope. This new information about consciousness—the changed metaphors
of mind—will enhance this effort. A number of composition theorists have challenged our discipline’s foundational images, the communication model. Typically,
disciplines are slow to reach their foundational issues. It took the “brain sciences” ninety years to even consider their fundamental issue—consciousness. Our
discipline has benefited from heated debates on many important issues, but about
our foundational thinking (the communication model) there has been mostly silence. Until recently, that is. At least four composition theorists are questioning
our current theory of language. Each describes the limitations imposed by the
“information transfer” model of language and calls for a better, more realistic
model. All four attack our assumptions about the dominant communication model.
James Thomas Zebroski is direct in his assault:
I want to argue that this “communication model” of language is simplistic and inadequate, and that it is, nonetheless, pervasive in the
composition discipline and the research issuing forth. Until the pervasiveness and inadequacy of this theory of language is recognized
and transcended, much of the new research in writing, as interesting as it may otherwise be, will tell us what in some sense we already know. To see writing activity in a truly new way, to find more
successful ways of teaching composition, we need to reconceptualize
our entire theory of language. (179)
He goes on to dissect the unreality of the “sender-receiver, encoding-decoding
model” (181) and the communication triangle upon which Western theories of
language are based. He argues forcefully that our discipline ought to adopt a
dialogic theory of language.
In a similar vein, Ann M. Penrose and Cheryl Geisler explore the limitations
which the “traditional information-transfer model” (507) imposes on our students.
They find that the model with which “students enter college classrooms” has a
“direct influence on reading and writing processes” (515). They argue that our
students are so limited by the model most prevalent in our institutions that “an
alternative to the information-transfer model [should] insist on more interactive
models of education in which a genuine rhetorical perspective is not only taught
but enacted” (517). They promise that the classroom and all within its walls will
change for the better when we adopt a more realistic model of communication.
Another assault on our dominant model of communication comes from Irene
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Ward: “many compositionists are abandoning the notion that written communication is a one-way process in which a reader decodes a message sent by a writer
via the conduit of language” (2). She traces the history of these “departures”
from the standard model (by some of our best known theorists) in great detail.
She examines the twists and turns that our discipline took as it matured into a
discipline. Although the dominant model of communication has been questioned
along the way, it remains firmly implanted and largely unchallenged. She then
calls for a new model to replace our current “process model,” which is flawed
because it is based on an unrealistic picture of communication. She wants to replace it with the theory of communication called Functional Dialogism. She argues “that dialogism is fundamental to the modern composition pedagogy” (203)
but that we generally do not acknowledge it.
That these teachers are calling for a thorough examination of our foundational assumptions about language is roughly parallel to the movement in the
“brain sciences.” Both disciplines require a model which is consistent with the
base reality. When the controlling image—the foundational metaphor—is out of
synch with the reality it attempts to illustrate, progress within that field is severely limited. We continue to train our students in a questionable model of communication—“information transfer”—for a number of reasons (reluctance to
change probably being the most significant). Perhaps we are also limited by our
current “top-down” image of how minds work. Although we’ve glimpsed into
the unruly, chaotic stream of our students’ largely untrained minds, we do not
understand what we see. We try to fix the mess. If our profession had “new ways
of thinking” about that tumult—a new metaphor of consciousness—we might do
a better job of “milking” that reality.
In this essay, I have outlined the scientific argument against the old model
of mind—the dualistic, hierarchical Self. Perhaps, if we in the field of writing
learn more about how minds work, we can use this knowledge to replace our
current model of communication with a model more reflective of real communication. I am partial to the dialogic models of communication suggested by
Zebroski, Penrose and Geisler, and Ward. After reading Bakhtin over a decade
ago, I started using dialogic methods in my writing pedagogy and became a convert. I see deep correspondences between a dialogic model of communication
and the new model of mind. These correspondences are abstract but crucial. Both
foundational models displace the centeredness of the self. The unitariness or
wholeness or completedness of the usual idea of Self is replaced by a sense of
self which is (in reality) incomplete, still-forming, still-responsive, always interactive; the flow of the dialogic self is—in communication and in biology—a process of discovery, uncertainty, and creativity. False certainty is dissipated by uncertainty. As I suggested in the beginning, teachers of writing sense the accuracy
of the new metaphors of mind. We see our students living in “the jungle” or attending the Pandemonium Theater. Many of us help them out of confusion by
assigning the five-paragraph essay, the Process Analysis, or Classification essay,
all with an outline. A dialogic model of communication would benefit our students immensely: students would not learn to fear confusion but would learn to
use it. They could shed their certainty and explore uncertainty. They might think
better if they were released from the requirement of linear thinking. But most
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important, they might grow more reflective under a dialogic model of communication. The old but dominant metaphor of mind sanctions the old, but dominant
models for communication. If you change one, you can change the other.
I see profound correspondences between these calls for a more realistic communication model and for new foundational images of consciousness. The old
models are regarded not only as misleading but also as limiting. Admittedly, I
have greatly oversimplified these new theories of consciousness and reduced the
science to what a humanist understands; I hope to intrigue my colleagues into
reading within these other disciplines. Clearly, the mind is our business, too. We
should be aware of the scientific changes eventually, ultimately coming our way.
While the debates among these “brain scientists” are heated, a consensus—a new
image of consciousness—has emerged. Once we have “new ways of thinking”
about our inner lives and understand the immense complexity of our material
system, we might reconnect to the spiritual. Material systems as complex as our
brains can produce amazing “spiritual” stuff. At the very least, “new ways of
thinking” will encourage a non-hierarchical approach to our material stuff, our
brains. We can appreciate and learn from the shifting pictures being floated out
of the scientific disciplines. New and better metaphors for mind are out there.
Perhaps more realistic pictures will help us unleash the depths and density we
fear many of our students do not have.
Don’t fear going into the jungle.
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